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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
GEORGE GHOST,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.

VS

12252

THELMA GHOS'l',
Defendant-Appellant.

I

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff for a divorce, and by
Defendant-Counterclaimant for a decree of separate
maintenance.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court awarded a df'cree of divorce to the
Plaintiff and denied the Defendant any relief on her
conntf'rclaim for separate maintenance. The Defendant
was denied the award of any alimony. In addition, the
Defendant was awarded the balance of the checking
ac('ount in the amount of $454.89, the furniture, and
fnrnishings in the apartment of the parties which were

acemnnlated during the rnaniagP, and $1:Z:J.U() aitonwy':o
fees for the use a.nd he1wfit of her attorrn·y in this aetion.
'l'he lmnT court awarded the Defendant n·al property
·which is the subject of a probate JH'L'Svntly JK•nding liefon• the same court, and in \\'hich '-'stat<' tlw })pfrndantAppt>Jlant is tlie only prns1wetin· li<·iL

lh,femlant se<'ks ren•rsal ol' UH· lowvr court\; dc·<"r<'t'
awarding a divol'l"e 1.o tllL' Plaintiff, and n•sp1•<'Utdly
requests that this Court dirPct the lo\n'l' court to l'ntPr
a decree of sl'pnratP rnaintenancP in
of tlie
Ddt>ndant-Appdla11L ln the alt<>rnatin•, s110nld tliis
Court not reverse the lower court's decree of divorc<',

then

Defernlant-Appt·llant sel'ks th<> H\\ ard of
alimony. D<:'f endant n•<1nests an mnud of 11l'l' costs and
attorney's fr<·s on this ap1wal.
tlw

On JJecL;rnlJer 9, 1DG9, the• Plainti l'f t'ilc·d a complaint
seeking a divorce in tl1is <"ase (R

On .March
1970, the Defendant filPd a eounterdairn sc·1·ki11g a cl<•en·c·
of separate
( H. 1 :l-1 S). The rnatter \\a:-'
tried in the lmn•r eomt on "?\la>· 7, 1970 (R. :Z:Z).
}[ost of tli<· <·vidc•ne'' addtl<'<'d at tli<· trinl

1mconh<w<•rtc•d, am1 tli<• <'\'irl<·m·<· \', liid1

\\'<lf'

dic;pntc•<l
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·was minimal. lTncontrovertt•<l facts which are material
to t}H; case are that tlw iiarties were married on February
2(i, rn:37 (R. 7:-l); that the Plaintiff was 78 vears
of a(Te
•
0
( H. (i2), and that lH' \ms in poor health,
from
kidm•y t rouhk•, a heart eonclition, bladder tronhle, and
dialwtc·s, all of whieh has required somP hospitalization
over the past fiyp years (R 73-74); that tlw DefendantCounterelaimant \Yas ()8 years of age, has rheumatoid
arthritis, a had back with two fusPd dises, is totally blind
in 011<' p:-P, and is losing the sigl1t in tlw other ey<', and
must have hPlp and assi:,;tancP lH'eam:p of lwr vision
prnhlems (H. 74, i:i & 79); that the Plaintiff is retirt>d
and re<'PivPs railroad rPtin•111<•nt pay of $190.75 lH'r
month, and Social S<·<·urity of $59.30
month (R. 50);
that th<' Dl'fen<lant n•eein•s railroad retirPment pay of
$80.35 lll'l" month, u'hiclt 11'ill fn111i11ate zcith a gra11ti11g of
o dicorce i11 this case, and Soeial S<•cnrity of $21.70 per
month (R. S); that on or ahout DecemhPr 18, 19G9, there
was a halanc<' in tlw eheeking account with Zion's First
Bank in the amount of $454.89 (R. 9); that there
liad hPPn a joint hank account in 19Gl with an approxi111a tP halaneP of $1,700.00 ( R. 3) ; that the Plaintiff reti n•d from Denvt>r & Rio Crarnk Railroad in 1959 (R.
:i'.l); and that tlw Plaintiff continned to work for several
\Pars for KPtehmn's, and hP Parn<'d $712.00 dnring 19(il,
1,2!J0.00 during 1!lG2, $1,200.00 dnring 19G:1, more than
$:!,000.00 during 1%4 and $1GO.OO in 19G5 (R. 5G); that

D<'l'<•Jl(lant had donP crol'hding for st>veral years and
l1at1 <•1u1wd from $GO.OO to $()0.00 pPr month (R. 90); that
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the Defendant had managed the financial affairs for
many yPars, and that all of the money was turned to the
Defendant to handle, excevt for small arnonnb of money
which the Plaintiff kept from clwcks before ht> gave the
money to the Defendant, an<l except for small amounts
given weekly
the Defrndant to Plaintiff for s1wnding
money (R. 5:3, 54, 57 & GG); that the Defrndant n•quired
approximately $175.00 to $180.UO iwr month to take can•
of her living ex1wnses (H. 87); that tlH" Defondant is the
sole heir of Margarl't l\ficha<·ls<'n, d<>c<>ased, and thP
Defendant anticipatt>s inheriting a fin-unit furnished
apartment hons!' ]o('ah"d at 4GS Sonth Eighth \Y Pst, Salt
Lab· City, Utah, Oll<' of which apartllwnts is oceupiPd
hy th<' J)pfonclant, and whieh r<>maining four aparh11Pnts
a gross rental income of $:2-1-G.OO

]H'I'

month, lPss

annual taxt>s of $:25G.OO, lights, gas, 1rntPr, n·pairs and
rnaintenanc<', advurtising and rl'dtwtion in ine0111P lw<"ansP
of rneanciPs (R. 9'.2, !J:-l, !JD, 100 & 101); and tl1at th<'
Defrndant, with th<· cons(·nt of tl1P Plaintiff, <'X!JPn<k•d
out of fam i

sa Yin gs m· e::;ta tPs rnon i<·s <l<·rived from

n·ntal incollW aJil>roximatPly $:2,000.00 to n•pair tlw
apartment hom;p which \\·as in d<·plorahl<' ('ondition, and
to

repla<'P

refrigPrators and

rang<·s, <t])(l $1,000.00

fel's in eonneetion \\'ith tl1e gaurdianship ol'
:\I idiaPlst'n, and

SOllH'

sulistant ial amounts for

the fun<>ral arnl burial <'XJH'nsl's ol'

t\\

o nm1ts of tlw

Df'frndant, wl1ieh arn<nrnts un· 11nt elt>ar l'ro111 till' n•eonl

( R. 71, l, 94, !Hi, !J7, !)8 & 101 ) .

As to the grounds for divorce and separate maintenance, and the conduct of the parties, there is some dispuk The Plaintiff testified that the parties had lived
in sevarate heds for 28 years, and that they lived together
lint had nothing to do with each other (R. 50-51). There
is no mention Pither through question of counsel or
throngh answer of ·witnesses of intercourse or cohabitation or laek thereof. 'l'he Plaintiff further testified that
on or ahout N ovem h<T 29, 1%9, that the Defendant told
tlH' Plaintiff to gPt l1is dotlws and gd out of her
prnp<'rt;-.·, and thn·"· hi:-; i'lni.tcase at him. In addition,
tliP Plaintiff frstifi<·d that shP hit him a couple of times,
and that she slap1wd him (R Gl ). He fnrther tPstifit'd
that she
him small amounts of spending money,
although he indicated at onP point that he cashed the
dwrks and kept some money for himsdf, and at another
point that slw tn·ated him all right after his retirement
(R. 54 & fi7). 'l'he Plaintiff kstified that the Defendant
had
him a "son of a bitch," but that she had not
('allPd hi111 any name since .Tnl)' of 1967 (R. 59).
On tlH' othPr hand, the J)pfondant frstified that then'
had been no ohjeetions hy the Plaintiff to the way the
finances wen• handled until N owmber of 1969 (R. 82),
that the Plaintiff lPft in Nowmher because the Defendant
\\·onldn't give the Plaintiff gambling money (R. 89), that
th<' 1iarti<'s <1nit sleeping together approximately five
.\·<·ar:-; ago wlwn the Defrndant had a back operation, and
1l:at

!ind not ealh'd him a "son of a hitch," hnt "an

old Greek" (R. 106). She further indicated that she told
the Plaintiff if they could not get along, that they may as
well separate, and he would likely get along better up
to,vn with his friends (R. 107).
As a result of the above-described conduet, the
Plaintiff testified that he folt badly (R. 51).
In support of her claim for separate maintenance,
the Defendant-Counterclaimant testified that the Plaintiff had threatened her, had used foul language, had
accused her of staying over night with a bachelor
tenant, had called her a "dirty bitch," "chippy," "son of
a bitch" and a ''dirty whore'' ( H. 8:2). In addition, she
testified that the Plaintiff had hrnndislwd a switch-bla(k
knife and kitchen

dming argume11bi. and that his

cursing all the tinw and ordering tenanb out of the
house provob-·d lwr to ask him to lt>ave (R 85-SG).
indicated that 8he had washed lti8 clotl1e::;, put tlH·m away,
mad<> his lwd, got his nwab on time, sa\\· to it that hP had
taken his medicine, and nursc•d him whilP <·onvaleseing·
(R. 83). The Defendant admittPd that tlH·re had lwen

stormy times during the rnaniage, and tliat tlH· Plaintiff
had left on four or five occasion::;, and slw eont'.l nckd
that separation was lwttPr for all eonc«'l'ned (H. 111 ).

ARGUMEWrs
POINT I
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ESTABLISH CRUEL
TREATMENT WHICH CAUSED HIM GREAT
MENTAL DISTRESS, AND THERE ARE COMPELLING REASONS JUSTIFYING THE DENIAL OF
THE DIVORCE TO THE PLAINTIFF.

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint "that for more
than one year last past the Defendant has treated the
Plaintiff cruelly causing him great mental and physical
suffering arnl

f.ipction 30-3-1 (7), Utah Code

Annotated 1953, ye:-:;ts the courts with pow<>r to grant a
divorce for cruel treatment, "to the extent of causing
liodily injury or great mental distress to the plaintiff."
'l'he lower eourt's finding concerning mental cruelty
is not suv110rtl>d by the

The court found that

tht> parties had not cohabited for 28 years when, in fact,
tht> Pvidenct> was that tht> iiarties were married on

2G,

and liwd togPther as man and wife

sineP tliat time nntil latP ] 9G9, with the exception of
S<'VPrnl

hri<'f pNiods of sPparation. 'L'liere is no evidence

in the record that tlwre was not inkreourse, or cohabita-

tion, or that tlw partiPs did not hold themselves out to
tlw \Yodel as man and wifr. Eall£'11fi11<''s Law Dictionary,
:\r(l <·<li lion ( 1%!)) , ddi1ws colrnliitation as a clm•lling

together of man and woman m the same place and
manner as husband and wife, and further indicates that
it does not necessarily imply sexual intercourse between
man and wife. Moreover, tlw record does not indicate
that the Defendant called the Plaintiff names on
numerous occasions. Plaintiff himself testified that she
had not called him nauws since the smmner of 19G7. The
record is almost silent on continual nagging and quarreling, but tlwre is so111e minimal refrreneP to a f<'w spats
or fights during the marriage. llowever, at one point,
the Plaintiff tPstified that the Defendant had treated
him all right 8ince Ill' rdired. lt i:-: not pt>rf Pctly clear
from that statement what he meant, as is the case with
mo8t of his tP8tiinony whieh was f'onfusing at best, notwithstanding the fad that the Plaintiff was 8poon-fe<l
through the major portion of liis din·<·t <·as<' with leading
qut>stions. 'I'hen· is no rden·nee in tlw reeord to tlw
Defendant thrnwing tlw <'lotlH•s of th<> Plaintiff out on
the poreh, hut the Plaintiff di<l t<>stit\ that his suiteasP
wa8 thrown out, and lw was ask<'d to kan•. 'l'he
eYidencP in th<• rt•<·ord to support thP trial eo11rt's
conel11sio11 that Plaintiff liad lwen caused gn•at mPntal
8nffrring was the statt>uwnt of the Plain ti ff that he felt
hadly. In rPsponse to DPfrndant's ohje('tion to Finding
nurnlwr four, thP low<·r court struek the sPntPnee th<'l't'frorn indieating that tlw Dl"frndant had tried to st!'ih
the Plaintiff on thP }wad with a chail' dnring tl1<• summel'
of 19G9. 1'hat ineidPnt p11rportedly took plaeP during
19G8, and thf' trial eonrt ('OrwlndPd tliat that was too
remote.

Other evidence in the record supporting the lower
court's conclusion of mental suffering was that the
Defendant had slapped the Plaintiff, that the Defendant
had only given the Plaintiff $5.00 or $6.00 per week for
spending money, and that the Defendant had made a
will, and had excluded the Plaintiff as a beneficiary
therein. Defendant testified that because of Plaintiff's
gambling he started wanting $10.00 or $20.00 per week,
and when the Defendant refused to give him more money,
he got sore. Considering the modest income of the
parties, it would serm that the Defendant was wise in
being judicious in hPr efforts to conserve family funds.
'11 here is no evidence in the record that Defendant might
have needlessly squandered money. However, she did
fix up the apartment house, and did discharge family
responsibihty by seeing that her two aunts were properly
put to rest. This was discussed by the parties, and the
Plaintiff told the Defendant to go ahead and make such
expenditures.
The tenor of the Plaintiff's case seemed to be that
he had worked hard all of his life, had earned all of the
money, and that the Defendant had taken everything
from him, and that he had nothing left. '11 he trial court
had definitely gained such impression, as he so indicated
when he announced his decision at the conclusion of the
trial. This author indicated to tlw court that it would be
his recommendation to the Defendant that she deed an
nndivided one third interest in the apartment house to
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the Plaintiff so that he would not fet>l clisinhPrited as a
'
preferabh, solution to the divorce. It -was r<'ported hack
to the court that the Defendant was :so willing to conn.Y
an undivided one third intere:st in the rPal 11roperty to
the Plaintiff so that he would have an inheritance. Said
offer was declined, and a divorC't' \\·as promptly grant0d
to th<:> Plaintiff.
'

In addition to the paucity of evidL•nc:(• affirrnativd)'
:supporting a conclusion of 1t1e11tal suf'frring, thPn-' is
substantial reaso11 for tlH· eourt 11ot to grn11t a (livon•(•.
Botl1 of the parties are aged and are in poor health, and
woHld be betkr off having the rnHtual support of the
other spouse. In addition, they have limited :sources of
income, which would go much further heing pooled,
rather than being divided to maintain fop two of thPm
separately. The most cogent fact is that the dirnrce automatically strips the D(•fernlant of much nved<'d ineorne h.Y
terminating the $80.55 montld)· railroad n·tin•ment h('nefit:s. Should the parti<>:s not lw in lJOsition to ahid(• ill('
physical presenCf' of 01w another, then a decn•c• of
separate maintenance would allow and 1wrn1it the
Plaintiff rea:sonahle fr('edorn, and wonld ]Jl'<'s<·rn this
much m•edPd income.
Considering the fact that tl1e parti<'s lwn ]wen
marriPd since F<'lmmry

2(),

1037, arnl thP fad that

have ])<'l'll somP cliffen•ne<'S in tlw past,

se->parations, arn1 n'e011eillintim1s

tll('1

]lli)·eoical

<•ol·, on<· 11111eot eon-

11
elude that the Plaintiff was hard-pressed to come up with
grounds when much he relied upon was both stale and
petty, and would seemingly have been condoned over
many years. See Shaw v. Shaw, 122 Mont. 593, 208 P.2d
514, 522 (Mont., 1949).
This Court has followed the mandate of the legislature, and has indicated in many opinions that the
Plaintiff must prove cruel treatment which causes great
mental distress. Stevenson v. Stevenson, 13 U.2d 153,
(Utah, 1962); Curry V. Curry, 7 U.2d 198,
369 P.2d
321 P.2d 939, 940 (Utah, 1958). Moreover, this Court
has taken the po::;ition in several cases that the conduct on
the part of the woman ought to be more aggravated to
constitute cruelty to the man, than in cases where the
wife seeks the divorce on the ground of cruelty. See
Alldredge 1'. Aldredge, 119 Utah 491, 229 P.2d 681,
G82-83 (Utah, 1951 ) , and cases cited therein.
In the case of Hyr11p v. Hyntp, GG Utah 850, 245 Pac.
335 (Utah 192(i), this Court was faced with a very similar
case as is before the Comt in this av1wal. The 70-year- o Id
•I d 51.A,ed h/5
air-old
for the divorce of a marriage which had lasted
for 45 yt'.ars on the gronnd of nwntal cruelty. He had
alleged, and there was evidence in the record in support
thl'reof, that his \\'ifo was of mean and cross disposition,
that shl• had iwrsistently and hahitnally ahnsed him and
ealled him vile and insulting names, and that she had
h1M.
. .
.
l M
with ind<•cPnt and Jnnrnliatmg remar rn.
ore-

1:2

over, he alleged that she had lwen sullen and eross and
had rno1ie<l ahont the house without s1waki11g to him or
noticing him, except to sneer at him. ln addition, lw
alleged that she had manifested great hatn·d for him and
had despised him, and that his lifr was nothing but hell.
Abo, he alleged that she had askt•<l him to }Pave her and
get a divorce on many OC('.asions. rrhe Utah Supreme
Court concluded that
'"as an uttn failure on th<·
part of Plaintiff to :show tliat hl' had :mfferl'd gn•a,t
mental distre:ss because of his wif P's allPgPd cnwl
conduct. The court also indieatv(l that tlH·rv \1·as no
direct testimony upon the snbject, and that th(• evidenet>
was not such that this essential fact could be therefrom
inferred. The trial court was direct<•d to dismi:ss th<>
action. See also Cord11er

1'.

CorJn<'r, 91Utah4GG, Gl P.2<l

GOl (Utah, 193G).
POINT I1
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
A DECREE OF SEPARATE .MAINTENANCE IN
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT-COUNTERCLAil\1ANT.

Section 30-4-1, Utah Code Annotafrd 1

provides

that when a man desPrts "his wifo iritlumt .r;ood

11J1d

snf ficicnt co use, or lwing of snfficient ahilit.v to support

her shall have negl<'cted or refused to proper].\· providP
for or snitahly maintai11 lier" th<'
require such a l111sl1a11d to pay

s11<

court
Ji :c;urns for eo:c;ts,
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expenses, fees, and support as it shall deem necessary
and proper. (Emphasis added.)
Plaintiff testified that the Defendant told him to get
ont. On the other hand, the Defendant testified as to
abnsive and vrovocative conduet on the part of the
Plaintiff, which was uncontrovPrted and which if believed
hy the court would surely justify her telling the Plaintiff

to behave or get out. 8lte indicated that she told Plaintiff if they couldn't get along, it would be well for them
to separate, and that he would be better off with his
friends. 'l'lH' tenor of lwr testimony seems to imply a
snggPstion rather tlian a command. It is respectfnllr
snhmittPd that the Plaintiffl testimon)' is full of inconsistencies and confusion, wherPas the tPstimony of
Defendant

is morc•

com;isknt

and

understandable.

Accordingly, this Court might conclude that Defendant
is the mor<:> creditable witness. Yiewing the evidence in
this light, onp might concludP that Plaintiff's leaving
])pfendant was hast)· and ill-advised and without good
and sufficient cause.
It is readily apparPnt that Plaintiff does not haw

a gTPat dt>al of inconw from which to pay Defendant
sPparate mainh•nance. HowPvt>r, a token award of such
this Court would at least prest•paratP lllaintt>nance
sPn-<•
1wr month in railroad rdirernent benefits to

14
the Defendant. Moreover, should the
of st>parate
maintenance not be followed up with a latn deer<·<·
of divorl'e, then tlw Defendant would rec!'in• some small
death benefits through the railroad rdiremrnt program.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE DOES l\'OT SUSTAIN THE
CONCLUSION BY THE LOWER COURT THAT
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ALil\lONY.

A fairly similar l'ase was lwfore this Court in the
Alldredge case, supra. ln that case, the G4-year-ol<l
lrnshand filed for a divorce against his 53-yPar-old wifr
to terminate a marriage of nearly 37 years. rl'}w partiPS
had lived tow·her as husband and wifo all that time. rrhat
ease differed from the cast' hefon• this Court in that thP
Alldredges had 11 f'hildn·n, whereas tltP Ohosts ha\·p
none. The f:lnpn•mp Court found that tlH• f'onduet of Mrs.
Alldrt-dge was sufficiPnt to support a dPen·<· of diYOl'f'<'
in favor of hf'r plaintiff husband; how<•v<·r, it eonelud<>d
that her eondnct was not so gn•\'iom; as to dqH"ivP lwr
of alimony. The Conrt concluded at pag<' liS5 that "a
wifr of long standing d<ws not forfPit all right to
alimon;· or a share in tlw prn])(•rt;· h<•eans<· of n·ePnt
misconduct nor in easl's wlH·rP tltP husband

lw

equally at fault nor m eases wl1en• th<•n• is a doulitfnl
prepondt>ram·<· against 01\' \\·if<> bPeans<· judgL·s, lH'ing
human, cannot p<•nctrat<· th<· l'alllil;· <lrnuia wi tli <·omplde
nndt>rstanding."
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This allthor sulnnirn that the granting of a
to

r. (Jlwst and the denial of alimonv
. to Mrs . Ghost is

manifest injnstice.

'rlw marriage had endured nearly

:l;) y<•an;; thl' ('on<luet of the D<·frndant was not gross, nor
did it involw any rnoral turpitudP: the Ddendant is GS
of ag<·, in failing lwalth, and is unable to earn any
a<l<litional in('OlllP: and li('r physi<·al frailtiPs impose a
gn•at <h·gT<'e of dPpenden('t' npon hc·r. By eornparison
\\·ith th<' l\'ngth of the• 111arriag<', t]1p 111arital trouhlt>
\1.·hid1 spaw111•d this

<"<1S\'

\\·as of ratht>r rPcent origin.

Othn pn·Yious s<'J i:1 rations havP not It'd to such drastie
result:-:.

lt is <·<·duinh· nnfortunat<• that tliP d<·hilitiPs

not tlH· fault of Piflt<'l' kd to thit> aetiou.

'l'hat ::such

<lc·hilities nltimatr•ly n•snlt<•d in tlw trial eonrt granting

a divon'<' and dqiriving the D<'ft>n<lant of all substantial
rigl1ts strnn11ing from t>twl1 a long-standing marriag<> is

a lwwild<'ring lll)·stt>ry and a trng<>dy of the greatest magui trnle.
POINT IV
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO
REQUIRE DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL TO CHOOSE
BETWEEN CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE
TIUAL AND GIVING TESTil\IONY CONCERNING
THE REASONABLE \'ALUE OF HIS ATTORNEY'S
FEES.

D<•l'<•JJ<iant 's l'om1sPl Pn<l<•avon•cl to testify as to the
n·;1:-001wld<· Yalu<• of his s<'tTic-<•s in support of Defendant-

Counterclaimant's claim for such fees. Plaintiff's
Counsel objected to such te8timony and urged that it was
an established rule of court that Counsel for the Defendant could not testify and then continue to participate in
the trial as an advocate. The trial judge agreed with this
point of view and required. Coumwl for the Defendant
to choose between testifying about the reasonable value
of his fee or continuing participation as advocate and
attorney for the Defendant. Accordingly, Couns<'l for
the Defendant chos<> to not te8tify, so that lw would lw
in a position to continue to participah' in tlH:' trial and to
offer a rlosing argument in lwhalf of his rlient.
Section 78-2-±-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides
that "all persons, without e.rceptio11, otherwise than as
specified in this chaptPr, who, having organs of sense,
can perceive, and perceiving can make known their
perception to othern, may he \\itnesses." (Emphasis added.) Said chapter on witm'sses does J1ot make any
exception as to the qualifications of an attorney to
testify. There are ethical considerations concerning an
attorney acting as a witne:-;s, and ::mch eonsi<lerations
are set forth in the new A.H.A. Codt' of Prnjessiowtl
Responsibility, Canon 5 (DR 5-102). rt'he notes to Canon
5 indieate that an attorney 8hould not lw a \ritiwss, <'Xeept
as to formal matters.
This Court has rnled on SPVPral oeeas10ns that a
claim for attonwy':-; frt•s cannot lH· soldy :-;npportC'd hy
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the
har sclwdule, hut that the moving party
must introduce
to establish tlw reasonable
n1lne or worth then,of. See U fr1h 8avi11gs & Loan Association v. N1t11ley, et al., 17 U.2d 3.+8, .+l] P.2d 838 ( l Ttah,
F.M.A. Fi11w1cial C'orJ!. 1-. Unilrl, lnr:., 17 U.'.?d SO,
-10-1mo ((Ttali, 19();)).
Coum;Pl for tlw Ddendant dParly }Jointed out to the
lower eourt that tlwrP \Yas no intPntion to offrr (•viden('P
through hirn as to
matters in dis1mt(' lH'b\·een the two
parties, hut that hi:-: te:-:tirnony would bP limited solPly to
the valup of sen·ict·:-: r<·ndnPd in conn('dion with tlH·
prosecution of the C"ase before the c.:ourt.
it is submitted that such testimony is a formal matter,
and that an attorney is, thPrefore, under no dhical
prohibition to not testify about the value of his fees. It
has bc0n long-standing practice among the members of
the bar of this state to appear in probate court regularly
and testify as a subscribing witness to a will. It would
seem that in such cases there might be greater room for
future conflict and problm1 than \Yhere an attorney
testifies ahout the value of sPrvii'0s which he rendered.
Services which an attorney renders in a given case
are peculiarly matters of lmowledge to that attorney.
Testimony from any other attorney would have to be
based upon mere speculation and conjecture. In the event
a hypothetical question were to he posed to another
that hypohdiC'al could only he grounded npon
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hearsay. The only attorney who would have actual knowledge of the time and efforts expended, or who would
have business records at his disposal indicating the time
and efforts expended, would be the participating attorney.
The only Utah cases found by this author support
the conclusion herein contained. ln the ease of MacClaren v. Gille::;pie, 19 Utah 137, 5G Pac. ()80 (Utah, 1899),
the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the attorney for one
of the parties eould testify about facts which tended to
contradict stah•ments made by the opposing party. 'l'hP
eouit recognized that such practice should only be
indulged in cases "'here necessity dictated. In the case
before the court, the attorney was the sole attorney for
the defendant, and the court conclndPd that the exigency
of the case dictated that the counsel testify to protect
the interests of his client. The Utah court was confronted
with a more imposing set of facts in the case of State v.
Greene, 38 Utah 389, 115 Pac. 181 (Utah, 1911), but still
concludPd that the attorrn-')' could testify. The attorney
in question had been the di::;trict attorney. At that time
the charges were prefern•d against the dt>frndant, he was
the district attorney and had pa rticipat<>d in the investigation of the case. During the course of the investigaion, said attorney had ohtaine<l an admission from the
defendant ahout a material faet to tlw charge involved.
vvnen

cas<' (•aJlle on for trial, said attorn<>y was no

longer in ofi'iet> as thr, district attorn(•y. Ilowev<'r, his
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associated him in the case, and the ex-district
attorney actively partici1iated in the prosecution of the
trial of the case. Notwithstanding the participation in
the trial of the case, the eourt permitted him to testify as
a '"itness, t>Yen though the defendant had not received
adyance notice that the State intended to use said attorm•y both as an advocate and as a witness.
POINT V
THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTED
THE AW ARD OF A LARGER ATTORNEY'S FEE.

The fee awardl·d Counsel for the Defendant is
certainly much less than is commensurate with the
reasonable value of the services rendered and based upon
the evidence before the court. However, considering the
financial circumstances of the parties, perhaps it was not
prejudicial Prror for the lower court to not award a more
customary fee for similar services. Yet, it is respectfully
submitted, that because of the necessity of this appeal,
this Court should allow some increase in the awarded
fees to compensate Defendant's Counsel for his efforts
which have been required to perfect and pursue this
appeal.
CONCLUSION
A careful review of the record must surely support
th<> eondusion that the ends of justice will best be served
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by the award of a token amount of 'wparat<· rnaintenancP
to the Defendant. Should this Court
to rParl1
such a result, tlH•n an a\\'ard of alimony should he granted
the Defrndant, l'Ven though in tok<'n amount. Thi' righb
of the Defrndant ::;hould be pn•serv<'d ::;o that site will be
in a position to later n•<•PiV<' help and assistaneP from the
Plaintiff, assuming that rn•<·Pssity so didatPs. Thi::; Court
:,;hould awanl an inercasPd fre to Coun:-;<•l for t!te
Dt>fendant for efforts t'XJH'JHl<'<l in p<>rf P<·tinp; and pnr;ming this appeal.
Aecordingly, th<• dt•<·ision of th<' lmn·r ('ourt sl1011lc1
he reversed and an appropriate ordPr :,;}10uld iss1w from
this Court directing thl• lower court to entPr a nPW <ken•f•
more c01npatiblP with the fon•going.
Costs should he awarded tht> Appellant.
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